Windows Live DFIR

Matrix - Enterprise - Windows | MITRE ATT&CK®attack.mitre.org

ATT&CK® Navigatormitre-attack.github.io

System Information

get-computerinfo
echo %DATE% %TIME%
date /t
time /t
reg query "HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\TimeZoneInformation"
systeminfo
wmic computersystem list full
wmic /node:localhost product list full /format:csv
wmic softwarefeature get name,version /format:csv
wmic softwareelement get name,version /format:csv
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion" /s
echo %PATH%
(gci env:path|Select -exp Value).split(';')
SET
wmic bootconfig get /all /format:List
wmic computersystem get name, domain, manufacturer, model, numberofprocessors,primaryownername,username,roles,totalphysicalmemory /format:list
wmic timezone get Caption, Bias, DaylightBias, DaylightName, StandardName
wmic recoveros get /all /format:List
wmic os get /all /format:list
wmic partition get /all /format:list
wmic logicaldisk get /all /format:list
wmic diskdrive get /all /format:list
fsutil fsinfo drives

Kill & Remove Services

# Wmic search for Chrome processes, Kills and Uninstalls
wmic process where name="chrome.exe" & wmic process where name="chrome.exe" call terminate & wmic product where "name like 'Google Chrome'" uninstall /nointeractive

wmic process where name="firefox.exe" & wmic process where name="firefox.exe" call terminate & wmic product where "name like 'Firefox'" uninstall /nointeractive

Resolve Device PublicIP /w Powershell

PS > Invoke-RestMethod ipinfo.io/ip
99.109.97.210

Obtain list of all files on a computer

dir secret.doc /s /p
tree C:\ /F > output.txt
dir C:\ /A:H /-C /Q /R /S /X

Local Temp Cache Folders

 \APPDATA\LOCAL\
 \APPDATA\LOCAL\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Cache

Registry Stuff

• Export the IniFileMapping key and saves to IniFileMapping.reg

Regedit /e IniFileMapping.reg "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\IniFileMapping"

User and admin information

whoami
whoami /user
net users
net localgroup administrators
net group /domain [groupname]
net user /domain [username]
wmic sysaccount
wmic useraccount get name,SID
wmic useraccount list

Logon information

wmic netlogin list /format:List
Get-WmiObject Win32_LoggedOnUser
Get-WmiObject win32_logonsession
query user
qwinsta
klist sessions
klist -li

NT Domain/Network Client Information

wmic ntdomain get /all /format:List
wmic netclient get /all /format:List
nltest /trusted_domains

Running Processes - Remote IP/Port & PID

netstat -a -n -o -b

Hunt a Process/Service/Product

wmic process where name="chrome.exe"
wmic process where name="chrome.exe" call terminate

wmic product where "name like 'Google Chrome'"
wmic product where "name like 'Google Chrome'" uninstall /nointeractive ~Uninstalls it

Uninstall Service

wmic product where "name like 'Google Chrome'" uninstall /nointeractive ##~Uninstalls it

Kill malicious process

wmic process where name="malware.exe" call terminate
wmic process where processid=[PID] delete
taskkill /IM malware.exe
taskkill /PID [PID] /T


taskkill /IM chrome.exe /F (Kills all chrome.exe processes.)

Firewall Information

netsh Firewall show state
netsh advfirewall firewall show rule name=all dir=in type=dynamic
netsh advfirewall firewall show rule name=all dir=out type=dynamic
netsh advfirewall firewall show rule name=all dir=in type=static
netsh advfirewall firewall show rule name=all dir=out type=static

Firewall Changes

Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Microsoft-Windows-Windows Firewall With Advanced Security/Firewall';} | FL TimeCreated, Message

Pagefile information

wmic pagefile

Group and access information

(Accesschk requires accesschk64.exe or accesschk.exe from sysinternals):

net localgroup
accesschk64 -a *

Cookies

C:\Users\*\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCookies
C:\Users\*\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Cookies
C:\Users\*\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Cookies\Low

RecentDocs Information

*Note: Run with Powershell, get SID and user information with ‘wmic useraccount get name,SID’

$SID = "S-1-5-21-1111111111-11111111111-1111111-11111"; $output = @(); Get-Item -Path "Registry::HKEY_USERS\$SID\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RecentDocs" | Select-Object -ExpandProperty property | ForEach-Object {$i = [System.Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetString((gp "Registry::HKEY_USERS\$SID\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RecentDocs" -Name $_).$_); $i = $i -replace '[^a-zA-Z0-9 \.\-_\\/()~ ]', '\^'; $output += $i.split('\^')[0]}; $output | Sort-Object -Unique

More information on recent documents may be found:

C:\Users\[username]\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\FileHistory\Data
gci "REGISTRY::HKU\*\Software\Microsoft\Office\*\Word\Reading Locations\*"

Startup process information

wmic startup list full
wmic startup list brief
Get-CimInstance Win32_StartupCommand | Select-Object Name, command, Location, User | FL

Startup process information by path/file name

Note: This will search common persistence areas but not all of them, change the $Malware variable value to a term of your choosing.

$Malware = "appdata";
$Processes = gps |?{$_.Path -match $Malware -or $_.Name -match $Malware} | FL Name,Path,Id;
$Tasks = schtasks /query /fo csv /v | ConvertFrom-Csv | ?{"$_.Task To Run" -match $Malware}| FL "Taskname","Task To Run","Run As User";
$Services = gwmi win32_service | ? {$_.PathName -match $Malware}| FL Name,PathName;
$ServiceDLL = reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services /s /v "ServiceDLL" | findstr "$Malware";
$RunKey1 = Get-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run*' | ?{$_ -match $Malware};
$RunKey2 = Get-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run*' | ?{$_ -match $Malware};
$UserProfiles = (gwmi Win32_UserProfile | ? { $_.SID -notmatch 'S-1-5-(18|19|20).*' }); $paths = $UserProfiles.localpath; $sids = $UserProfiles.sid; for ($counter=0; $counter -lt $UserProfiles.length; $counter++){$path = $UserProfiles[$counter].localpath; $sid = $UserProfiles[$counter].sid; reg load hku\$sid $path\ntuser.dat};
$RunKey3 = Get-ItemProperty -Path Registry::HKU\*\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run* | ?{$_ -match $Malware};
$Startup = Select-String -Path 'C:\Users\*\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\*' -Pattern $Malware | Select Path;
$Startup2 = Select-String -Path 'C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp\*' -Pattern $Malware | Select Path;
if ($Processes) {echo "Process Found!";$Processes} else {echo "No Running Processes Found."};
if ($Tasks) {echo "Tasks Found!";$Tasks} else {echo "No Tasks Found."};
if ($Services) {echo "Services Found!";$Services} else {echo "No Services Found."};
if ($ServiceDLL) {echo "ServiceDLL Found!";$ServiceDll} else {echo "No Service Dlls Found."};
if ($RunKey1) {echo "Wow6432Node Run Key Found!";$RunKey1} else {echo "No Local Machine Wow6432Node Run Key Found."};
if ($RunKey2) {echo "Local Machine Run Key Found!";$RunKey2} else {echo "No Local Machine Run Key Found."};
if ($RunKey3) {echo "User Run Key Found!";$RunKey3} else {echo "No User Run Key Found."};
if ($Startup) {echo "AppData Startup Link Found!";$Startup} else {echo "No AppData Startups Found."};
if ($Startup2) {echo "ProgramData Startup Link Found!";$Startup2} else {echo "No ProgramData Startups Found."};

Startup process information by path/file name

Note: This will search common persistence areas but not all of them, change the $Malware variable value to a term of your choosing.

$Malware = "appdata";
$Processes = gps |?{$_.Path -match $Malware -or $_.Name -match $Malware} | FL Name,Path,Id;
$Tasks = schtasks /query /fo csv /v | ConvertFrom-Csv | ?{"$_.Task To Run" -match $Malware}| FL "Taskname","Task To Run","Run As User";
$Services = gwmi win32_service | ? {$_.PathName -match $Malware}| FL Name,PathName;
$ServiceDLL = reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services /s /v "ServiceDLL" | findstr "$Malware";
$RunKey1 = Get-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run*' | ?{$_ -match $Malware};
$RunKey2 = Get-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run*' | ?{$_ -match $Malware};
$UserProfiles = (gwmi Win32_UserProfile | ? { $_.SID -notmatch 'S-1-5-(18|19|20).*' }); $paths = $UserProfiles.localpath; $sids = $UserProfiles.sid; for ($counter=0; $counter -lt $UserProfiles.length; $counter++){$path = $UserProfiles[$counter].localpath; $sid = $UserProfiles[$counter].sid; reg load hku\$sid $path\ntuser.dat};
$RunKey3 = Get-ItemProperty -Path Registry::HKU\*\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run* | ?{$_ -match $Malware};
$Startup = Select-String -Path 'C:\Users\*\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\*' -Pattern $Malware | Select Path;
$Startup2 = Select-String -Path 'C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp\*' -Pattern $Malware | Select Path;
if ($Processes) {echo "Process Found!";$Processes} else {echo "No Running Processes Found."};
if ($Tasks) {echo "Tasks Found!";$Tasks} else {echo "No Tasks Found."};
if ($Services) {echo "Services Found!";$Services} else {echo "No Services Found."};
if ($ServiceDLL) {echo "ServiceDLL Found!";$ServiceDll} else {echo "No Service Dlls Found."};
if ($RunKey1) {echo "Wow6432Node Run Key Found!";$RunKey1} else {echo "No Local Machine Wow6432Node Run Key Found."};
if ($RunKey2) {echo "Local Machine Run Key Found!";$RunKey2} else {echo "No Local Machine Run Key Found."};
if ($RunKey3) {echo "User Run Key Found!";$RunKey3} else {echo "No User Run Key Found."};
if ($Startup) {echo "AppData Startup Link Found!";$Startup} else {echo "No AppData Startups Found."};
if ($Startup2) {echo "ProgramData Startup Link Found!";$Startup2} else {echo "No ProgramData Startups Found."};

Scheduled task/job information

at (For older OS)
schtasks
schtasks /query /fo LIST /v
schtasks /query /fo LIST /v | findstr "Task To Run:"
schtasks /query /fo LIST /v | findstr "appdata"
schtasks /query /fo LIST /v | select-string "Enabled" -CaseSensitive -Context 10,0 | findstr "exe"
schtasks /query /fo LIST /v | select-string "Enabled" -CaseSensitive -Context 10,0 | findstr "Task"
schtasks /query /fo LIST /v | Select-String "exe" -Context 2,27 
gci -path C:\windows\system32\tasks -recurse | Select-String Command | ? {$_.Line -match "EXENAME"} | FL Line, Filename
gci -path C:\windows\system32\tasks -recurse | where {$_.CreationTime -ge (get-date).addDays(-1)}|Select-String Command|FL Filename,Line
gci -path C:\windows\system32\tasks -recurse | where {$_.CreationTime -ge (get-date).addDays(-1)} | where {$_.CreationTime.hour -ge (get-date).hour-2}|Select-String Command|FL Line,Filename
schtasks /query /fo csv /v | ConvertFrom-Csv | ?{"$_.Task To Run" -match "MALICIOUS"}| FL "Taskname","Task To Run"
schtasks /query /fo csv /v | ConvertFrom-Csv | ?{$_.Taskname -ne "TaskName"} | FL "Taskname","Task To Run"
wmic job get Name, Owner, DaysOfMonth, DaysOfWeek, ElapsedTime, JobStatus, StartTime, Status

Powershell:

Get-ScheduledTask
gci -path C:\windows\system32\tasks -recurse | Select-String Command | FL Filename, Line
gci -path C:\windows\system32\tasks -recurse | Select-String Command | ? {$_.Line -match "MALICIOUSNAME"} | FL Filename, Line

Remediate malicious scheduled tasks

schtasks /Delete /TN [taskname] /F

Powershell:

Unregister-ScheduledTask -TaskName [taskname]
Unregister-ScheduledTask -TaskPath [taskname]

UAC Bypass Fodhelper

reg query HKCU\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command
reg query HKU\{SID}\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command

Quick overview of persistent locations (AutoRuns)

autorunsc.exe -accepteula -a * -c -h -v -m > autoruns.csv
autorunsc.exe -accepteula -a * -c -h -v -m -z 'E:\Windows' > autoruns.csv

Persistence and Automatic Load/Run Reg Keys

Replace: “reg query” with “Get-ItemProperty -Path HK:" in Powershell*

e.g.: Get-Item -Path HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run

User Registry (NTUSER.DAT HIVE) - Commonly located at:

C:\Users\[username]

*Note: These are setup for querying the current users registry only (HKCU), to query others you will need to load them from the relevant NTUSER.DAT file and then query them.

reg query "HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"
reg query "HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce"
reg query "HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx"
reg query "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\StartupApproved\Run"
reg query "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\StartupApproved\Run32"
reg query "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\StartupApproved\StartupFolder"
reg query "HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run"
reg query "HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows" /f run
reg query "HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows" /f load
reg query "HKCU\Environment" /v UserInitMprLogonScript
reg query "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" /v RESTART_STICKY_NOTES
reg query "HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders"
reg query "HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Windows\Scripts"
reg query "HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\RecentDocs"
reg query "HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\RunMRU"
reg query "HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RunMRU"
reg query "HKCU\SOFTWARE\AcroDC"
reg query "HKCU\SOFTWARE\Itime"
reg query "HKCU\SOFTWARE\info"
reg query "HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\User Shell Folders"
reg query "HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Command Processor"
reg query "HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Applets\RegEdit" /v LastKey
reg query "HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\ComDlg32\OpenSavePidlMRU" /s
reg query "HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Shell"
reg query "HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\currentversion\run"
reg query "HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Terminal Server\Install\Software\Microsoft\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"
reg query "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Terminal Server\Install\Software\Microsoft\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce"
reg query "HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\[Random]\StubPath" /s
reg query "HKCU\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\[Random]\StubPath" /s
reg query "HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Office\[officeversion]\[word/excel/access etc]\Security\AccessVBOM"
reg query "HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\IEAK\GroupPolicy\PendingGPOs" /s
reg query "HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Control Panel\CPLs"
reg query "HKCU\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Control Panel\CPLs"
	reg query "HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Office\15.0\Excel\Security\AccessVBOM
	reg query "HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Office\15.0\Word\Security\AccessVBOM
	reg query "HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Office\15.0\Powerpoint\Security\AccessVBOM
	reg query "HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Office\15.0\Access\Security\AccessVBOM

Local Machine (SOFTWARE HIVE)

reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce"
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx"
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce"
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices"
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System\Scripts"
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows" /f AppInit_DLLs
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run"
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Win\Userinit"
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options"
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options" /s
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SilentProcessExit" /s
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\wow6432node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\policies\explorer\run"
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\wow6432node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\run"
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows"
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Office\[officeversion]\[word/excel/access etc]\Security\AccessVBOM"
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\StartupApproved\Run"
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\StartupApproved\Run32"
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\StartupApproved\StartupFolder"
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AeDebug"
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\[Random]\StubPath" /s
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\[Random]\StubPath" /s
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Control Panel\CPLs"
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Control Panel\CPLs"
	reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Office\15.0\Excel\Security\AccessVBOM
	reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Office\15.0\Word\Security\AccessVBOM
	reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Office\15.0\Powerpoint\Security\AccessVBOM
	reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Office\15.0\Access\Security\AccessVBOM

Don’t be afraid to use “findstr” to find entries of interest, for example file extensions which may also invoke malicious executables when run, or otherwise.

reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes" | findstr "file"
reg query HKCR\CLSID\{AB8902B4-09CA-4bb6-B78D-A8F59079A8D5} /s
reg query HKCR\AppID\ /s | findstr "exe"

Local Machine (SYSTEM HIVE)

Note: This not only contains services, but also malicious drivers which may run at startup (these are in the form of “.sys” files and are generally loaded from here: \SystemRoot\System32\drivers)

reg query "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\[Random_name]\imagePath"
reg query "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\ /s /f "*.exe"
reg query "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services" /s | findstr "ImagePath" | findstr ".exe"
reg query "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services" /s | findstr "ImagePath" | findstr ".sys"
reg query "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager" /v BootExecute
Get-Service -Name "*MALICIOUSSERVICE*"
gwmi win32_service | ? {$_.PathName -match "MALICIOUSSERVICE"}|FL Name,PathName
Get-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\*" | FL DisplayName,ImagePath,ObjectName
gci -Path C:\Windows\system32\drivers -include *.sys -recurse -ea 0 -force | Get-AuthenticodeSignature
gci -Path C:\Windows\system32\drivers -include *.sys -recurse -ea 0 -force | Get-FileHash

Note: Some useful commands to show relevant service information

reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services /s /v "ImagePath"
reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services /s /v "ServiceDLL"
reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services /s /v "FailureCommand"

MITRE ATT&CK Persistence

TO DO - Automate enumeration

T1015 Accessibility Features

reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\sethc.exe" /v "Debugger"
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\utilman.exe" /v "Debugger"
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\AtBroker.exe" /v "Debugger"
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\Narrator.exe" /v "Debugger"
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\Magnify.exe" /v "Debugger"
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\DisplaySwitch.exe" /v "Debugger"
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\osk.exe" /v "Debugger"
sfc /VERIFYFILE=C:\Windows\System32\sethc.exe
sfc /VERIFYFILE=C:\Windows\System32\utilman.exe
sfc /VERIFYFILE=C:\Windows\System32\AtBroker.exe
sfc /VERIFYFILE=C:\Windows\System32\Narrator.exe
sfc /VERIFYFILE=C:\Windows\System32\Magnify.exe
sfc /VERIFYFILE=C:\Windows\System32\DisplaySwitch.exe
sfc /VERIFYFILE=C:\Windows\System32\osk.exe

Event Triggered Execution: Accessibility Features, Sub-technique T1546.008 - Enterprise | MITRE ATT&CK®attack.mitre.org

T1098 Account Manipulation

TODO

https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/

T1182 AppCert DLLs

reg query "HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager" /v AppCertDlls

https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1182/

T1103 AppInit DLLs

reg query "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows" /v Appinit_Dlls
reg query "HKLM\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows" /v Appinit_Dlls
reg query "HKU\{SID}\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows" /v Appinit_Dlls
reg query "HKU\{SID}\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows" /v Appinit_Dlls
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{ LogName='System'; Id='11'} | FL TimeCreated,Message

https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1103/

T1138 Application Shimming

reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Custom"
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\InstalledSDB"
dir %WINDIR%\AppPatch\custom
dir %WINDIR%\AppPatch\AppPatch64\Custom
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-ShimEngine/Operational';}|FL

https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1138/

T1197 BITS Jobs

bitsadmin /list /allusers /verbose
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{ LogName='Microsoft-Windows-Bits-Client/Operational'; Id='59'} | FL TimeCreated,Message
ls 'C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Network\Downloader\qmgr.db'

https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1197/

https://ired.team/offensive-security/persistence/t1197-bits-jobs

T1067 Bootkit

Note: This exists below the OS in the Master Boot Record or Volume Boot Record. The system must be booted through Advanced Startup Options with a Command Prompt, or through a recovery cd.

bootrec /FIXMBR
bootrec /FIXBOOT

Extra: If your boot configuration data is missing or contains errors the below can fix this.

bootrec /REBUILDBCD

If you’re thinking of a bootkit more as malicious system drivers you can go with the below.

Unsigned Drivers

Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{ LogName='Microsoft-Windows-CodeIntegrity/Operational'; Id='3001'} | FL TimeCreated,Message
gci -path C:\Windows\System32\drivers -include *.sys -recurse -ea SilentlyContinue | Get-AuthenticodeSignature | where {$_.status -ne 'Valid'}

Unload malicious filter driver

fltmc filters
fltmc volumes
fltmc instances
fltmc unload <filtername>
fltmc detach <filtername> <volumeName> <instanceName>

https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1067/

T1176 Browser Extensions

Chrome

Get-ChildItem -path "C:\Users\*\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Extensions" -recurse -erroraction SilentlyContinue
Get-ChildItem -path 'C:\Users\*\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Extensions' -recurse -erroraction SilentlyContinue -include manifest.json | cat
reg query "HKLM\Software\Google\Chrome\Extensions" /s
reg query "HKLM\Software\Wow6432Node\Google\Chrome\Extensions" /s

Firefox

Get-ChildItem -path "C:\Users\*\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\extensions" -recurse -erroraction SilentlyContinue
Get-ChildItem -path "C:\Program Files\Mozilla Firefox\plugins\" -recurse -erroraction SilentlyContinue
Get-ChildItem -path registry::HKLM\SOFTWARE\Mozilla\*\extensions

Edge

Get-ChildItem -Path C:\Users\*\AppData\Local\Packages\ -recurse -erroraction SilentlyContinue

Internet Explorer

Get-ChildItem -path "C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\Plugins\" -recurse -erroraction SilentlyContinue
reg query 'HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Browser Helper Objects'
reg query 'HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Toolbar'
reg query 'HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\URLSearchHooks'
reg query 'HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Explorer Bars'
reg query 'HKU\{SID}\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Explorer Bars'
reg query 'HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Extensions'

https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1176/

T1109 Component Firmware

Note: This is incredibly rare, and doesn’t have an easy detection/remediation mechanism. Using the Windows CheckDisk utility, System File Checker, or Deployment Image Servicing and Management may assist but isn’t guaranteed.

chkdsk /F
sfc /scannow
dism /Online /Cleanup-Image /ScanHealth
dism /Online /Cleanup-Image /RestoreHealth
dism /Online /Cleanup-Image /StartComponentCleanup /ResetBase

https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1109/

T1122 Component Object Model (COM) Hijacking

Note: This involves replacing legitimate components with malicious ones, and as such the legitimate components will likely no longer function. If you have a detection based on DLLHost.exe with /Processid:{xyz}, you can match xyz with the CLSID (COM Class Object) or AppID mentioned below to check for any malicious EXE or DLL.

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\WOW6432Node\CLSID\{abc} /v AppID /t REG_SZ /d {xyz}
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{abc} /v AppID /t REG_SZ /d {xyz}
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\AppID\{xyz}
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\WOW6432Node\AppID\{xyz}
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Classes\AppID\{xyz}

Example analysis:

reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\WOW6432Node\CLSID\" /s /f "{973D20D7-562D-44B9-B70B-5A0F49CCDF3F}"
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\WOW6432Node\CLSID\{178167bc-4ee3-403e-8430-a6434162db17}" /s
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\AppID\{973D20D7-562D-44B9-B70B-5A0F49CCDF3F}"

Queries:

reg query HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\ /s /f ".dll"
reg query HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\ /s /f ".exe"
reg query HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\AppID\ /s /f DllSurrogate
gci -path REGISTRY::HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\*\shell\open\command 
reg query HKU\{SID}\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\ /s /f ".dll"
reg query HKU\{SID}\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\ /s /f ".exe"
gci 'REGISTRY::HKU\*\Software\Classes\CLSID\*\TreatAs'
gci 'REGISTRY::HKU\*\Software\Classes\Scripting.Dictionary'
gci "REGISTRY::HKU\*\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\*\LocalServer32" -ea 0
gci "REGISTRY::HKU\*\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\*\InprocServer32" -ea 0
gci "REGISTRY::HKU\*\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\*\InprocHandler*" -ea 0
gci "REGISTRY::HKU\*\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\*\*Server32" -ea 0
gci "REGISTRY::HKU\*\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\*\ScriptletURL" -ea 0
reg query HKU\{SID}\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\ /s /f "ScriptletURL"

Get list of all COM Objects

{Original by Jeff Atwood](https://stackoverflow.com/questions/660319/where-can-i-find-all-of-the-com-objects-that-can-be-created-in-powershell)

gci HKLM:\Software\Classes -ea 0| ? {$_.PSChildName -match '^\w+\.\w+$' -and(gp "$($_.PSPath)\CLSID" -ea 0)} | select -ExpandProperty PSChildName

https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1122/

T1136 Create Account

net user
net user /domain

https://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/windows/

T1038 DLL Search Order Hijacking

reg query "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\KnownDLLs"
gci -path C:\Windows\* -include *.dll | Get-AuthenticodeSignature | Where-Object Status -NE "Valid"
gci -path C:\Windows\System32\* -include *.dll | Get-AuthenticodeSignature | Where-Object Status -NE "Valid"
gps | FL ProcessName, @{l="Modules";e={$_.Modules|Out-String}}
gps | ? {$_.Modules -like '*{DLLNAME}*'} | FL ProcessName, @{l="Modules";e={$_.Modules|Out-String}}
$dll = gps | Where {$_.Modules -like '*{DLLNAME}*' } | Select Modules;$dll.Modules;

https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1038/

T1133 External Remote Services

N/A

T1044 File System Permissions Weakness

Get-WmiObject win32_service | FL name,PathName
get-acl "C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Update\GoogleUpdate.exe" | FL | findstr "FullControl"

https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1044/

T1158 Hidden Files and Directories

dir /S /A:H

https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1158/

T1179 Hooking

Finding EasyHook Injection

tasklist /m EasyHook32.dll;tasklist /m EasyHook64.dll;tasklist /m EasyLoad32.dll;tasklist /m EasyLoad64.dll;

More Material:

• Contextis Blog

• GetHooks

https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1179/

T1062 Hypervisor

N/A

T1183 Image File Execution Options Injection

reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SilentProcessExit" /s	| findstr "MonitorProcess"
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options" /s	| findstr "Debugger"

https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1183/

https://ired.team/offensive-security/privilege-escalation/t1183-image-file-execution-options-injection

T1037 Logon Scripts

reg query "HKU\{SID}\Environment\UserInitMprLogonScript"

https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/

https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1037/T1037.md

T1177 LSASS Driver

Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{ LogName='Security'; Id='4614';} | FL TimeCreated,Message
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{ LogName='Security'; Id='3033';} | FL TimeCreated,Message
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{ LogName='Security'; Id='3063';} | FL TimeCreated,Message

https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1177/

T1031 Modify Existing Service

reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services /s /v "ImagePath"
reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services /s /v "ServiceDLL"
reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services /s /v "FailureCommand"

https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1031/

https://pentestlab.blog/2020/01/22/persistence-modify-existing-service/

T1128 Netsh Helper DLL

reg query HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Netsh

https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1128/

https://ired.team/offensive-security/persistence/t1128-netsh-helper-dll

T1050 New Service

reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services /s /v "ImagePath"
reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services /s /v "ServiceDLL"
reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services /s /v "FailureCommand"
Get-WmiObject win32_service | FL Name, DisplayName, PathName, State
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{ LogName='System'; Id='7045';} | FL TimeCreated,Message

https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1050/

https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1050/T1050.md

T1137 Office Application Startup

reg query "HKU\{SID}\Software\Microsoft\Office test\Special\Perf" /s
reg query "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Office test\Special\Perf" /s
Get-ChildItem -path registry::HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Office\*\Addins\*
Get-ChildItem -path registry::HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432node\Microsoft\Office\*\Addins\*
Get-ChildItem -path registry::HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432node\Microsoft\Office\*\Addins\*
Get-ChildItem -path "C:\Users\*\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Templates\*" -erroraction SilentlyContinue
Get-ChildItem -path "C:\Users\*\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Excel\XLSTART\*" -erroraction SilentlyContinue
Get-ChildItem -path C:\ -recurse -include Startup -ea 0
ls 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16\XLSTART'
ls 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16\STARTUP'
reg query HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office\<Outlook Version>\Outlook\WebView\Inbox
reg query HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office\<Outlook Version>\Outlook\Security
reg query HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office\<Outlook Version>\Outlook\Today\UserDefinedUrl
reg query HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office\<Outlook Version>\Outlook\WebView\Calendar\URL
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{ LogName='Microsoft Office Alerts'; Id='300';} | FL TimeCreated,Message

https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/

T1034 Path Interception

N/A

T1013 Port Monitors

reg query "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Monitors" /s /v "Driver"

https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1013/

T1504 PowerShell Profile

ls C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\Profile.ps1
ls C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\Microsoft.*Profile.ps1
ls C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\Microsoft.*Profile.ps1
gci -path "C:\Users\*\My Documents\PowerShell\Profile.ps1"
gci -path "C:\Users\*\My Documents\PowerShell\Microsoft.*Profile.ps1"

https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1504/

T1108 Redundant Access

N/A

T1060 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

reg query "HKU\{SID}\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"
reg query "HKU\{SID}\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce"
reg query "HKU\{SID}\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx"
reg query "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"
reg query "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce"
reg query "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx"
reg query "HKU\{SID}\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders"
reg query "HKU\{SID}\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders"
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders"
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders"
reg query "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce"
reg query "HKU\{SID}\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce"
reg query "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices"
reg query "HKU\{SID}\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices"
reg query "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run"
reg query "HKU\{SID}\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run"
reg query "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Userinit"
reg query "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Shell"
reg query "HKU\{SID}\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows"
reg query "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager" /v BootExecute
gci -path "C:\Users\*\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\*" -include *.lnk,*.url
gci -path "C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp\*" -include *.lnk,*.url
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{ LogName='Microsoft-Windows-Shell-Core/Operational'; Id='9707'} | FL TimeCreated,Message
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{ LogName='Microsoft-Windows-Shell-Core/Operational'; Id='9708'} | FL TimeCreated,Message

https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1060/

T1053 Scheduled Task

gci -path C:\windows\system32\tasks | Select-String Command | FT Line, Filename
gci -path C:\windows\system32\tasks -recurse | where {$_.CreationTime -ge (get-date).addDays(-1)} | Select-String Command | FL Filename,Line
gci -path C:\windows\system32\tasks -recurse | where {$_.CreationTime -ge (get-date).addDays(-1)} | where {$_.CreationTime.hour -ge (get-date).hour-2}| Select-String Command | FL Line,Filename
gci -path 'registry::HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tasks\'
gci -path 'registry::HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tree\'
ls 'C:\Windows\System32\WptsExtensions.dll'
	Note: thanks to [Markus Piéton](https://twitter.com/markus_pieton/status/1189559716453801991) for this one.

https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/

T1180 Screensaver

reg query "HKU\{SID}\Control Panel\Desktop" /s /v "ScreenSaveActive"
reg query "HKU\{SID}\Control Panel\Desktop" /s /v "SCRNSAVE.exe"
reg query "HKU\{SID}\Control Panel\Desktop" /s /v "ScreenSaverIsSecure"

https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1180/

T1101 Security Support Provider

reg query "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig" /v "Security Packages"
reg query "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa" /v "Security Packages"

https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1101/

T1505 Server Software Component

N/A

T1058 Service Registry Permissions Weakness

get-acl REGISTRY::HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\* |FL
get-acl REGISTRY::HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\servicename |FL

https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1058/

T1023 Shortcut Modification

Select-String -Path "C:\Users\*\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\*.lnk" -Pattern "exe"
Select-String -Path "C:\Users\*\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\*.lnk" -Pattern "dll"
Select-String -Path "C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp\*" -Pattern "dll"
Select-String -Path "C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp\*" -Pattern "exe"
gci -path "C:\Users\" -recurse -include *.lnk -ea SilentlyContinue | Select-String -Pattern "exe" | FL
gci -path "C:\Users\" -recurse -include *.lnk -ea SilentlyContinue | Select-String -Pattern "dll" | FL

https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1023/

T1198 SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking

reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\OID\EncodingType 0\CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg" /s /v "Dll"
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\OID\EncodingType 0\CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData" /s /v "Dll"
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\Providers\Trust\FinalPolicy" /s /v "`$DLL"
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Cryptography\OID\EncodingType 0\CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg" /s /v "Dll"
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Cryptography\OID\EncodingType 0\CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData" /s /v "Dll"
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Cryptography\Providers\Trust\FinalPolicy" /s /v "`$DLL"

https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1198/

T1209 Time Providers

reg query "HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders" /s | findstr "Dll"

https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1209/

T1078 Valid Accounts

N/A

T1100 Web Shell

gci -path "C:\inetpub\wwwroot" -recurse -File -ea SilentlyContinue | Select-String -Pattern "runat" | FL
gci -path "C:\inetpub\wwwroot" -recurse -File -ea SilentlyContinue | Select-String -Pattern "eval" | FL

https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1100/

T1084 Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription

Get WMI Namespaces

Function Get-WmiNamespace ($Path = 'root')
{
	foreach ($Namespace in (Get-WmiObject -Namespace $Path -Class __Namespace))
	{
		$FullPath = $Path + "/" + $Namespace.Name
		Write-Output $FullPath
		Get-WmiNamespace -Path $FullPath
	}
}
Get-WMINamespace -Recurse

https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1084/

Query WMI Persistence

Get-WmiObject -Class __FilterToConsumerBinding -Namespace root\subscription
Get-WmiObject -Class __EventFilter -Namespace root\subscription
Get-WmiObject -Class __EventConsumer -Namespace root\subscription

T1004 Winlogon Helper DLL

reg query "HKU\{SID}\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Notify" /s
reg query "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Notify" /s
reg query "HKU\{SID}\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /v "Userinit"
reg query "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /v "Userinit"
reg query "HKU\{SID}\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /v "Shell"
reg query "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /v "Shell"
reg query "HKLM\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /s

https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1004/

Other Persistence

Winsock Persistence

Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{ LogName='Microsoft-Windows-Winsock-WS2HELP/Operational'; Id='1'} | FL TimeCreated,Message

Check disabled task manager (often from malware)

reg query HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System /v DisableTaskMgr

Review Hivelist

gp REGISTRY::HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\hivelist | Select *USER*

Locate all user registry keys

$UserProfiles = Get-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\ProfileList\*" | Where {$_.PSChildName -match "S-1-5-21-(\d+-?){4}$" } | Select-Object @{Name="SID"; Expression={$_.PSChildName}}, @{Name="UserHive";Expression={"$($_.ProfileImagePath)\ntuser.dat"}}

Load all users registry keys from their ntuser.dat file (perform above first)

Foreach ($UserProfile in $UserProfiles) {If (($ProfileWasLoaded = Test-Path Registry::HKEY_USERS\$($UserProfile.SID)) -eq $false) {reg load HKU\$($UserProfile.SID) $($UserProfile.UserHive) | echo "Successfully loaded: $($UserProfile.UserHive)"}}

Query all users run key

Foreach ($UserProfile in $UserProfiles) {reg query HKU\$($UserProfile.SID)\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run};

Unload all users registry keys

Foreach ($UserProfile in $UserProfiles) {reg unload HKU\$($UserProfile.SID)};

Remediate Automatic Load/Run Reg Keys

reg delete [keyname] /v [ValueName] /f
reg delete [keyname] /f
Foreach ($UserProfile in $UserProfiles) {reg delete HKU\$($UserProfile.SID)\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce /f}
Foreach ($UserProfile in $UserProfiles) {reg delete HKU\$($UserProfile.SID)\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run /f}

Powershell:

Remove-ItemProperty -Path "[Path]" -Name "[name]"

Check Registry for IE Enhanced Security Modification

gci 'REGISTRY::HKU\*\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap'
gci 'REGISTRY::HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap'

Check Registry for disabling of UAC (1=UAC Disabled)

gci REGISTRY::HKU\*\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA 
gci REGISTRY::HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA 

Review Software Keys for malicious entries

gci registry::HKLM\Software\*
gci registry::HKU\*\Software\*

Scan Registry keys for specified text

Get-ChildItem -path HKLM:\ -Recurse -ea SilentlyContinue | where {$_.Name -match 'notepad' -or $_.Name -match 'sql'}
Get-ChildItem -path HKLM:\ -Recurse -ea SilentlyContinue | get-itemproperty | where {$_ -match 'notepad' -or $_ -match 'sql'}
reg query HKLM\SOFTWARE /s /f ".exe"
reg query HKLM\SYSTEM /s /f ".exe"
reg query HKLM\SECURITY /s /f ".exe"
reg query HKLM /s /f ".exe"

Persistent file locations of interest

%localappdata%\<random>\<random>.<4-9 file ext>
%localappdata%\<random>\<random>.lnk
%localappdata%\<random>\<random>.bat
%appdata%\<random>\<random>.<4-9 file ext>
%appdata%\<random>\<random>.lnk
%appdata%\<random>\<random>.bat
%appdata%\<random>\<random>.bat
%SystemRoot%\<random 4 chars starting with digit>
%appdata%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\*
"C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp\*"
%SystemRoot%\System32\<randomnumber>\
%SystemRoot%\System32\tasks\<randomname>
%SystemRoot%\\<randomname>
C:\Users\[user]\appdata\roaming\[random]
C:\Users\[user]\appdata\roaming\[random]
C:\Users\Public\*

Search lnk,bat,dll's

You can scan these directories for items of interest e.g. unusual exe, dll, bat, lnk etc files with:

dir /s /b %localappdata%\*.exe | findstr /e .exe
dir /s /b %appdata%\*.exe | findstr /e .exe
dir /s /b %localappdata%\*.dll | findstr /e .dll
dir /s /b %appdata%\*.dll | findstr /e .dll
dir /s /b %localappdata%\*.bat | findstr /e .bat
dir /s /b "%appdata%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\" | findstr /e .lnk
dir /s /b "C:\Users\Public\" | findstr /e .exe
dir /s /b "C:\Users\Public\" | findstr /e .lnk
dir /s /b "C:\Users\Public\" | findstr /e .dll
dir /s /b "C:\Users\Public\" | findstr /e .bat
ls "C:\Users\[User]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup" | findstr /e .lnk

Locate LNK Files with a particular string (Special thanks to the notorious)

Select-String -Path 'C:\Users\[User]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\*.lnk' -Pattern "powershell" | Select Path

Master File Table

The Master File Table is an incredibly important artifact; however, this can only be read or obtained using low level disk reading. This contains an entry for every file or directory on the filesystem including metadata about these files, and may provide evidence on files which have been removed (MFT entries marked as ‘free’). More information can be found on MS Docs (https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/master-file-table)

Determine Timestomping

Within the Master File Table (Located at the Win root) there are 2 elements, $STANDARD_INFORMATION and $FILE_NAME, both of which have values for a file being created, modified, accessed and written.

These are known as MACB times (Modified, Accessed, Changed, Birth). The $STANDARD_INFORMATION element can be modified from a malicious process, but the $FILE_NAME element is left intact and cannot without some extra trickery.

These discrepancies generally indicate Timestomping with the $FILE_NAME entry being the source of truth. This can be determined by obtaining the MFT (e.g. using a tool such as Rawcopy), and comparing timestamps on the file (e.g. using a tool such as MFTExplorer).

Rawcopy

RawCopy.exe /FileNamePath:C:0 /OutputPath:C:\Audit /OutputName:MFT_C.bin

MFTExplorer

Enable Date Accessed Timestamps

reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\FileSystem" /v NtfsDisableLastAccessUpdate /d 0 /t REG_DWORD /f

Remove BITSAdmin Persistence

bitsadmin /reset /allusers
import-module bitstransfer
Get-BitsTransfer -AllUsers | Remove-BitsTransfer

Check system directories for executables not signed as part of an operating system release

gci C:\windows\*\*.exe -File -force |get-authenticodesignature|?{$_.IsOSBinary -notmatch 'True'}

Locate Possible Trickbot

gci -path C:\Users\*\AppData\Roaming\*\Data -recurse -force -ea SilentlyContinue
gci -path C:\Users\*\AppData\Roaming\*\Modules -recurse -force -ea SilentlyContinue
gci -path C:\Users\*\AppData\Local\*\Data -recurse -force -ea SilentlyContinue
gci -path C:\Users\*\AppData\Local\*\Modules -recurse -force -ea SilentlyContinue
gci -path C:\Users\*\AppData\Roaming\*\*\Data -recurse -force -ea SilentlyContinue
gci -path C:\Users\*\AppData\Roaming\*\*\Modules -recurse -force -ea SilentlyContinue
gci -path C:\Users\*\AppData\Local\*\*\Data -recurse -force -ea SilentlyContinue
gci -path C:\Users\*\AppData\Local\*\*\Modules -recurse -force -ea SilentlyContinue
gci -path C:\Windows\System32\config\systemprofile\appdata\roaming -recurse -force -include *.exe
schtasks /query /fo LIST /v | findstr "appdata"	
schtasks /query /fo LIST /v | findstr "programdata"	
schtasks /query /fo LIST /v | findstr "public"	
tasklist /svc | findstr "svchost"

Determine if user Trusted a doc/spreadsheet etc and ran a macro

Note: Don’t forget to load in user hives.

reg query 'HKU\[SID]\Software\Microsoft\Office\[versionnumber]\Word\Security\Trusted Documents\TrustRecords';
gci 'REGISTRY::HKU\*\Software\Microsoft\Office\*\*\Security\Trusted Documents\TrustRecords' -ea 0 | foreach {reg query $_.Name}

Note: This will show the file name/location and metadata in Hex. If the last lot of hex is FFFFFF7F then the user enabled the macro.

Check Office Security Settings

gci REGISTRY::HKU\*\Software\Microsoft\Office\*\*\Security -rec
gci REGISTRY::HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office\*\*\Security -rec

Prevent CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, CVE-2018-0804, CVE-2018-0805, CVE-2018-0806, CVE-2018-0807 (EQNEDT32.EXE) Exploitation

Note: This is the “Equation Editor” exploit, either patch or mitigate. More information on the below process.

64-Bit Windows:

reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Office\Common\COM Compatibility\{0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}" /v "Compatibility Flags" /t REG_DWORD /d 0x400
reg delete "HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID\{0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
reg delete "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\Equation.3"

32-Bit Windows:

reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Office\Common\COM Compatibility\{0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}" /v "Compatibility Flags" /t REG_DWORD /d 0x400 /f
reg delete "HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\WOW6432Node\CLSID\{0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
reg delete "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\Equation.3" /f

Determine if user opened a document

gci "REGISTRY::HKU\*\Software\Microsoft\Office\*\Word\Reading Locations\*"

Prevent Executable from Running.

Note: Load in hives and add particular SID to prevent users running named files, helps prevent for example your IIS service account from running cmd.exe or powershell.exe

reg ADD "HKU\{SID}\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer" /v DisallowRun /t REG_DWORD /d "00000001" /f
reg ADD "HKU\{SID}\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\DisallowRun" /v malware.exe /t REG_SZ /d "malware.exe" /f

Show known file extensions and hidden files (excluding OS hidden files)

reg ADD "HKU\{SID}\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced" /v Hidden /t REG_DWORD /d "1" /f
reg ADD "HKU\{SID}\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced" /v HideFileExt /t REG_DWORD /d "0" /f
Stop-Process -processname explorer

Open File Extension (e.g. scripts) with certain application (elevated cmd)

FTYPE Custom=Notepad.exe "%1"
ASSOC .wsf=Custom

Disable Command Prompt

reg ADD "HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\System" /v DisableCMD /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f

Locate Possible DLL Search Order Hijacking

Note: A legitimate clean executable can be used to run malicious DLLs based on how the software searches for them.

More information on Microsoft Docs

reg query "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\KnownDLLs"
reg query "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\SafeDllSearchMode"

Search order for desktop applications:

If SafeDllSearchMode is enabled (is by default), the search order is as follows:

• The same directory from which the executable is run.

• The System Directory (Usually C:\Windows\System32).

• The 16-bit System Directory.

• The Windows Directory (Usually C:\Windows).

• The Current Directory (From the process which executed the executable).

• The directories that are listed in the PATH environment variable.

If SafeDllSearchMode is disabled (SafeDllSearchMode has a reg value of 0), the search order is as follows:

• The same directory from which the executable is run.

• The Current Directory (From the process which executed the executable).

• The System Directory (Usually C:\Windows\System32).

• The 16-bit System Directory.

• The Windows Directory (Usually C:\Windows).

• The directories that are listed in the PATH environment variable.

Locate Possible Dll Side Loading

Note: A legitimate clean executable can be used to run malicious DLLs based on issues with a manifest file used by the application to load DLLs.

reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\SideBySide\Winners"

By placing a malicious DLL in the below locations legitimate binaries may have been used to sideload these malicious DLLs.

• C:\Windows\WinSxS

• C:\Windows\SXS

Unique Sideload DLL hashes (may take some time)

(gci -path C:\Windows\WinSxS -recurse -include *.dll|gi -ea SilentlyContinue|filehash).hash|sort -u

Unsigned or Invalid Sideload DLLs (there will be a lot)

gci -path C:\Windows\WinSxS -recurse -include *.dll | Get-AuthenticodeSignature | Where-Object Status -NE "Valid"

Unsigned Sideload DLLs (Less noise)

gci -path C:\Windows\WinSxS -recurse -include *.dll | Get-AuthenticodeSignature | Where-Object Status -E "NotSigned"
gci -path C:\Windows\WinSxS -recurse -include *.ocx | Get-AuthenticodeSignature | Where-Object Status -NE "Valid"

Hash of Unsigned Sideload DLLs

gci -path C:\Windows\WinSxS -recurse -include *.dll | Get-AuthenticodeSignature | Where-Object Status -E "NotSigned" | Select Path | gi -ea SilentlyContinue | filehash | sort -u
gci -path C:\Windows\WinSxS -recurse -include *.ocx | Get-AuthenticodeSignature | Where-Object Status -NE "Valid" | Select Path | gi -ea SilentlyContinue | filehash | sort -u

Find files without extensions

Get-ChildItem -Path C:\Users\[user]\AppData -Recurse -Exclude *.* -File -Force -ea SilentlyContinue

Remediate malicious files

rmdir %localappdata%\maliciousdirectory\ /s
del /F %localappdata%\maliciousdirectory\malware.exe

Powershell:

Remove-Item [C:\Users\Public\*.exe]
Remove-Item -Path [C:\Users\Public\malware.exe] -Force
Get-ChildItem * -Include *.exe -Recurse | Remove-Item

Detect Persistent WMI Subscriptions

Get-WmiObject -Class __FilterToConsumerBinding -Namespace root\subscription
Get-WmiObject -Class __EventFilter -Namespace root\subscription
Get-WmiObject -Class __EventConsumer -Namespace root\subscription

Remediate Persistent WMI Subscriptions

Get-WMIObject -Namespace root\subscription -Class __EventFilter -Filter "Name='[Name]'" | Remove-WmiObject
Get-WMIObject -Namespace root\subscription -Class CommandLineEventConsumer -Filter "Name='[Name]'" | Remove-WmiObject
Get-WMIObject -Namespace root\subscription -Class __FilterToConsumerBinding -Filter "__Path like '%[Name]%'" | Remove-WmiObject 

Enumerate WMI Namespaces

Function Get-WmiNamespace ($Path = 'root')
{
	foreach ($Namespace in (Get-WmiObject -Namespace $Path -Class __Namespace))
	{
		$FullPath = $Path + "/" + $Namespace.Name
		Write-Output $FullPath
		Get-WmiNamespace -Path $FullPath
	}
}
Get-WMINamespace -Recurse

Mimikatz/Credential Extraction Detection

The below represent registry keys which make it more difficult for Mimikatz to work. Modification of these keys may indicate an attacker trying to execute Mimikatz within an environment if they were set to their more secure state. Always test prior to changing registry keys such as these in a production environment to ensure nothing breaks.

HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest
	- “UseLogonCredential” should be 0 to prevent the password in LSASS/WDigest
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa
	- “RunAsPPL” should be set to dword:00000001 to enable LSA Protection which prevents non-protected processes from interacting with LSASS. 
	- Mimikatz can remove these flags using a custom driver called mimidriver.
		- This uses the command **!+** and then **!processprotect /remove /process:lsass.exe** by default so tampering of this registry key can be indicative of Mimikatz activity.

The Mimikatz Yara rule may also prove useful.

Some techniques may involve loading lsasrv.dll or wdigest.dll to extract credentials and may be caught if this is loaded legitimately using:

tasklist /m wdigest.dll
tasklist /m lsasrv.dll

You may be able to detect changes to the below registry keys which can be used to load an arbitrary DLL and extract credentials, more information from Adam Chester

reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\NTDS /v LsaDbExtPt
reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\NTDS\DirectoryServiceExtPt

An adversary may also tamper with the number of cached logons a system holds (default of 10).

reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /v CachedLogonsCount

NetNTLM Downgrade Attack Detection

reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa /v LMCompatibilityLevel
reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa /v RestrictSendingNTLMTraffic 
reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa /v NTLMMinClientSec

DanderSpritz eventlogedit

Putty Detection

reg query HKCU\Software\SimonTatham\PuTTY\Sessions /s

Installed Updates

(WMI Quick Fix Engineering)

wmic qfe

Installed Software/Packages

reg query HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\ /s | findstr "DisplayName"
reg query HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\ /s | findstr "DisplayName"
wmic product get name,version /format:csv
wmic product get /ALL
dism /online /get-packages

Powershell: Full List for all users using uninstall keys in registry

$(Get-ItemProperty HKLM:\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\*; Get-ItemProperty HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\*;New-PSDrive -Name HKU -PSProvider Registry -Root Registry::HKEY_USERS| Out-Null;$UserInstalls += gci -Path HKU: | where {$_.Name -match 'S-\d-\d+-(\d+-){1,14}\d+$'} | foreach {$_.PSChildName };$(foreach ($User in $UserInstalls){Get-ItemProperty HKU:\$User\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\*});$UserInstalls = $null;try{Remove-PSDrive -Name HKU}catch{};)|where {($_.DisplayName -ne $null) -and ($_.Publisher -ne $null)} | Select DisplayName,DisplayVersion,Publisher,InstallDate,UninstallString |FT

Process information

(pslist requires sysinternals pslist.exe):

tasklist -v
wmic process list full /format:csv
wmic process get name,parentprocessid,processid /format:csv
wmic process get ExecutablePath,processid /format:csv
wmic process get name,ExecutablePath,processid,parentprocessid /format:csv | findstr /I "appdata"
wmic process where processid=[PID] get parentprocessid
wmic process where processid=[PID] get commandline
wmic process where "commandline is not null and commandline!=''" get name,commandline /format:csv
gwmi win32_process -Filter "name like 'powershell.exe'" | select name,processId,commandline|FL
gwmi win32_process | select name,processId,path,commandline|FL
gwmi win32_process |FL ProcessID,ParentProcessID,CommandLine,@{e={$_.GetOwner().User}}
gwmi win32_process | Sort-Object -Property ProcessID | FL ProcessID,Path,CommandLine,ParentProcessID,@{n="User";e={$_.GetOwner().User}},@{n="ParentProcessPath";e={gps -Id $_.ParentProcessID|Select -exp Path}}
pslist

PowerShell Module to show Process Tree

import-module .\Get-ProcessTree.ps1
Get-ProcessTree -Verbose | FT Id, Level, IndentedName, ParentId,Path,CommandLine

Current Process execution or module loads from temporary directories

Note: This will likely have some false positives as it’s just a wildcard. So in this case using ‘temp’ can come up in words such as ‘ItemProvider’.

(gps -Module -ea 0).FileName|Select-String "Appdata","ProgramData","Temp","Users","public"|unique

Current Process execution or module loads from temporary directories + hash

$A=((gps -Module -ea 0).FileName|Select-String "Appdata","ProgramData","Temp","Users","public"|sort|unique);foreach ($B in $A) {filehash $B};
$A=((gps).Path|Select-String "Appdata","ProgramData","Temp","Users","public"|sort|unique);foreach ($B in $A) {filehash $B};

Scan for malware with Windows Defender

"%ProgramFiles%\Windows Defender\MpCmdRun.exe" -Scan -ScanType 1
"%ProgramFiles%\Windows Defender\MpCmdRun.exe" -Scan -ScanType 2
"%ProgramFiles%\Windows Defender\MpCmdRun.exe" -Scan -ScanType 3 -File C:\Users\[username]\AppData\Local\Temp

Note: Types are as follows

• 1: Quick scan

• 2: Full system scan

• 3: File and directory custom scan

Check Windows Defender for excluded files and default actions

reg query "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Exclusions" /s
Get-ChildItem 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Exclusions'
Get-MpPreference | Select Exclusion*
Get-MpPreference | Select *DefaultAction

Delete Windows Defender excluded files

reg delete "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Exclusions\Paths" /v "[RegkeyValue]"
reg delete "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Exclusions\Paths"
Remove-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Exclusions\Paths' -Name "Paths"

Check and Set Access Control Lists

Get-Acl -Path 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Exclusions\Paths'|FL
Get-Acl -Path [FileWithRequiredAccess] | Set-Acl -Path 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Exclusions\Paths'

Change ACE for “everyone” on folder and subfiles/folders

Grant everyone full access

icacls "C:\{DESIREDFOLDERPATH}" /grant everyone:(CI)(OI)F /T

Remove ACE entries for “everyone”

icacls "C:\{DESIREDFOLDERPATH}" /remove everyone /T

Make multiple files visible and remove ‘superhidden’

gci C:\{DESIREDFOLDERPATH} -force -recurse -ea 0 | foreach {$_.attributes = 'Normal'};
attrib -s -h C:\{DESIREDFOLDERPATH}\*.*

Check Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) and Access Control Entries (ACE) for services

sc sdshow <servicename>
$A=get-service;foreach ($service in $A){$service;sc.exe sdshow $service.Name}
$A=get-service;foreach ($service in $A){$service;sc.exe sdshow $service.Name|Select-String "A;*DC"}
$A=get-service;foreach ($service in $A){$service;sc.exe sdshow $service.Name|Select-String "A;*WD"}
$A=get-service;foreach ($service in $A){$service;sc.exe sdshow $service.Name|Select-String "A;*WO"}

More information on ACE Strings and the level of access they can provide.

Kill “Unstoppable” Service/Process

reg add HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\{SERVICENAME}\XblAuthManager\Parameters /V start /T reg_dword /D 4 /F
sc.exe sdset {SERVICENAME} "D:(A;;CCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRRC;;;SY)(A;;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;;;BA)(A;;CCLCSWLOCRRC;;;IU)(A;;CCLCSWLOCRRC;;;SU)S:(AU;FA;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;;;WD)"
Get-Service -Name {SERVICENAME} | Set-Service -Status Paused
sc.exe config {SERVICENAME} start= disabled
Get-Service -Name {SERVICENAME} | Set-Service -Status Stopped
tasklist /FI "IMAGENAME eq {SERVICEEXENAME}"
taskkill /F /t /IM "{SERVICEEXENAME}"

Obtain hash for all running executables

Issues with spaces in names but supports CMD.exe

FOR /F %i IN ('wmic process where "ExecutablePath is not null" get ExecutablePath') DO certutil -hashfile %i SHA256 | findstr -v : >> output.txt

Powershell (Special thanks Lee Holmes)

(gps|gi -ea SilentlyContinue|filehash).hash|sort -u

My less efficient powershell

foreach ($process in Get-WmiObject win32_process | where {$_.ExecutablePath -notlike ""}) {Get-FileHash $process.ExecutablePath | Format-List}

foreach ($process in Get-WmiObject win32_process | where {$_.ExecutablePath -notlike ""}) {Get-FileHash $process.ExecutablePath | select Hash -ExpandProperty Hash}

$A = $( foreach ($process in Get-WmiObject win32_process | where {$_.ExecutablePath -notlike ""}) {Get-FileHash $process.ExecutablePath | select Hash -ExpandProperty Hash}) |Sort-Object| Get-Unique;$A

Obtain hash and established network connections for running executables with dns cache

Get-NetTCPConnection -State Established | Select RemoteAddress, RemotePort, OwningProcess, @{n="Path";e={(gps -Id $_.OwningProcess).Path}},@{n="Hash";e={(gps -Id $_.OwningProcess|gi|filehash).hash}}, @{n="User";e={(gps -Id $_.OwningProcess -IncludeUserName).UserName}},@{n="DNSCache";e={(Get-DnsClientCache -Data $_.RemoteAddress -ea 0).Entry}}|sort|gu -AS|FT

Obtain hash and listening network connections for running executables

Get-NetTCPConnection -State LISTEN | Select LocalAddress, LocalPort, OwningProcess, @{n="Path";e={(gps -Id $_.OwningProcess).Path}},@{n="Hash";e={(gps -Id $_.OwningProcess|gi|filehash).hash}}, @{n="User";e={(gps -Id $_.OwningProcess -IncludeUserName).UserName}}|sort|gu -AS|FT	

Obtain hash and possible tunneled network connections for running executables

Get-NetTCPConnection -State ESTABLISHED |? LocalAddress -Like "::1" | Select RemoteAddress, RemotePort, OwningProcess, @{n="Path";e={(gps -Id $_.OwningProcess).Path}},@{n="Hash";e={(gps -Id $_.OwningProcess|gi|filehash).hash}}, @{n="User";e={(gps -Id $_.OwningProcess -IncludeUserName).UserName}},@{n="DNSCache";e={(Get-DnsClientCache -Data $_.RemoteAddress).Entry}}|sort|gu -AS|FT
Get-NetTCPConnection -State Established |? LocalAddress -Like "127.0.0.1"| Select RemoteAddress, RemotePort, OwningProcess, @{n="Path";e={(gps -Id $_.OwningProcess).Path}},@{n="Hash";e={(gps -Id $_.OwningProcess|gi|filehash).hash}}, @{n="User";e={(gps -Id $_.OwningProcess -IncludeUserName).UserName}},@{n="DNSCache";e={(Get-DnsClientCache -Data $_.RemoteAddress).Entry}}|sort|gu -AS|FT
Get-NetTCPConnection -State LISTEN |? LocalAddress -Like "127.0.0.1" | Select LocalAddress, LocalPort, OwningProcess, @{n="Path";e={(gps -Id $_.OwningProcess).Path}},@{n="Hash";e={(gps -Id $_.OwningProcess|gi|filehash).hash}}, @{n="User";e={(gps -Id $_.OwningProcess -IncludeUserName).UserName}}|sort|gu -AS|FT

Obtain workstation name for tunneled authentication

Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{ LogName='Security'; Id='4624'; Data='::';} | FL TimeCreated,Message

Obtain hash of DLLs currently loaded by processes

$A = $(foreach ($dll in gps|select -ExpandProperty modules -ea SilentlyContinue|? FileName -NotLike "C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\*"){Get-FileHash $dll.FileName| select Hash -ExpandProperty Hash})|Sort-Object| Get-Unique;$A
$A = $(foreach ($dll in gps|select -ExpandProperty modules -ea SilentlyContinue){Get-FileHash $dll.FileName| select Hash -ExpandProperty Hash})|Sort-Object| Get-Unique;$A

Obtain processes running which are running a DLL

$A=(gps|select -ExpandProperty modules -ea SilentlyContinue | where {$_.ModuleName -Like 'sechost.dll' -or $_.ModuleName -Like 'ntdll.dll'} | sort -u);if($A[0].Size -ge -1) {foreach ($Module in $A){tasklist /m $Module.ModuleName}};
gps | FL ProcessName, @{l="Modules";e={$_.Modules|Out-String}}

Obtain hash of unsigned or invalid DLLs currently loaded by processes

$A=$(foreach ($dll in gps|select -ExpandProperty modules -ea SilentlyContinue){Get-AuthenticodeSignature $dll.FileName |Where-Object Status -NE "Valid"|Select Path});$B=$(foreach ($dll in $A){Get-FileHash $dll.Path| select Hash -ExpandProperty Hash})|Sort-Object| Get-Unique;$B

Obtain list of unsigned DLLs currently loaded by processes

gps | select -exp modules -ea 0 | Select -exp FileName | Get-AuthenticodeSignature|Where-Object Status -NE "Valid"
gps | select -exp modules -ea 0 | Select -exp FileName | Get-AuthenticodeSignature | ? Status -NE "Valid" | FL Path

Obtain DLL information ListDLLs

listdlls [-r] [-v | -u] [processname|pid]
listdlls [-r] [-v] [-d dllname]

Obtain unsigned DLL information loaded by processes

listdlls -u

Obtain DLLs in use by processes

listdlls -v processname -accepteula
listdlls -v -d dllname.dll -accepteula
listdlls -v PID -accepteula

Determine handles on a file

handle [[-a] [-u] | [-c <handle> [-l] [-y]] | [-s]] [-p <processname>|<pid>> [name]
handle -a -u -s -p exp
handle windows\system

Verify EternalBlue Patch (MS17-010) is installed - Microsoft

Note: This impacts the SMB 1.0 Server Driver, if you don’t have the below, then it’s not installed. If you do you can use the above to determine patch level.

get-item C:\Windows\system32\drivers\srv.sys | FL VersionInfo
get-hotfix -id KB<111111>

Obtain TXT records from recently resolved domains

foreach ($domains in Get-DnsClientCache){Resolve-DnsName $domains.Entry -Type "TXT"|Select Strings|? Strings -NotLike ""};

Check all Appdata files for unsigned or invalid executables

Get-ChildItem -Recurse $env:APPDATA\..\*.exe -ea SilentlyContinue| ForEach-object {Get-AuthenticodeSignature $_ -ea SilentlyContinue} | Where-Object {$_.status -ine "Valid"}|Select Status,Path

Check for execuables in Local System User Profile and Files

Get-ChildItem C:\Windows\*\config\systemprofile -recurse -force -ea 0 -include *.exe, *.dll *.lnk

Investigate WMI Usage

Note: Requires Strings

strings -q C:\windows\system32\wbem\repository\objects.data

Find executables and scripts in Path directories ($env:Path)

Get-Command * -Type Application | FT -AutoSize
Get-Command -Name * | FL FileVersionInfo

Find files created/written based on date

Get-ChildItem C:\ -recurse -ea SilentlyContinue -force | where-object { $_.CreationTime.Date -match "12/25/2014"}
Get-ChildItem C:\ -recurse -ea SilentlyContinue -force | where-object { $_.LastWriteTime -match "12/25/2014"}
Get-ChildItem C:\ -recurse -ea SilentlyContinue -force | where-object { $_.CreationTime.Hour -gt 2 -and $_.CreationTime.Hour -lt 15}

Check running executables for malware via VirusTotal

Note: VT Has a rate limit for the Public API so this won’t work if you are using the Public API. All 1 liners require VTAPIKey to be set as your VirusTotal API key

foreach ($process in Get-WmiObject win32_process | where {$_.ExecutablePath -notlike ""}) {Invoke-RestMethod -Method 'POST' -Uri 'https://www.virustotal.com/vtapi/v2/file/report' -Body @{ resource =(Get-FileHash $process.ExecutablePath | select Hash -ExpandProperty Hash); apikey = "[VTAPIKey]"}}

This query uses a 15 second timeout to ensure only 4 queries are submitted a minute

foreach ($process in Get-WmiObject win32_process | where {$_.ExecutablePath -notlike ""}) {Invoke-RestMethod -Method 'POST' -Uri 'https://www.virustotal.com/vtapi/v2/file/report' -Body @{ resource =(Get-FileHash $process.ExecutablePath | select Hash -ExpandProperty Hash); apikey = "[VTAPIKey]"};Start-Sleep -Seconds 15;}

This query uses a 15 second timeout to ensure only 4 queries are submitted a minute and only unique hashes are queried

$A = $( foreach ($process in Get-WmiObject win32_process | where {$_.ExecutablePath -notlike ""}) {Get-FileHash $process.ExecutablePath | select Hash -ExpandProperty Hash}) |Sort-Object| Get-Unique -AsString; foreach ($process in $A) {Invoke-RestMethod -Method 'POST' -Uri 'https://www.virustotal.com/vtapi/v2/file/report' -Body @{ resource =($process); apikey = "[VTAPIKey]"};Start-Sleep -Seconds 15;} 

Scan systems for IOA/IOC (Yara)

Loki Scanner

loki-upgrader.exe
loki.exe -p [Directory]

Crowdresponse Scanner

CrowdResponse -v -i config.txt -o out.xml

IREC Tactical

IREC.exe --triage-memory
IREC.exe -ad "\\MACHINE\IREC-DIR" --triage-ruleset MyYaraRules --triage-memory 

Yara

yara32.exe -d filename=[file defined in ruleset.yar] [ruleset.yar] [file to scan]
yara32.exe -d filename=[svchost.exe] [ruleset.yar] -r [directory to scan]

Yara Linux

yara rule.yara malware.exe -s